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Abstract
We introduce a network valuation model (hereafter NEVA) for the ex-ante valua-
tion of claims among financial institutions connected in a network of liabilities. Similar
to previous work, the new framework allows to endogenously determine the recovery
rate on all claims upon the default of some institutions. In addition, it also allows
to account for ex-ante uncertainty on the asset values, in particular the one arising
when the valuation is carried out at some time before the maturity of the claims. The
framework encompasses as special cases both the ex-post approaches of Eisenberg and
Noe and its previous extensions, as well as the ex-ante approaches, in the sense that
each of these models can be recovered exactly for special values of the parameters. We
characterize the existence and uniqueness of the solutions of the valuation problem
under general conditions on how the value of each claim depends on the equity of the
counterparty. Further, we define an algorithm to carry out the network valuation and
we provide sufficient conditions for convergence to the maximal solution.
Keywords: Interbank Claim Valuation; Network Valuation; Financial Network; Sys-
temic Risk; Credit risk; Default; Contagion
1 Introduction
Uncertainty and interdependence are two fundamental features of financial systems. While
uncertainty over the future value of assets is traditionally very central in the financial lit-
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erature (Merton, 1974), interdependence of financial claims’ values, especially in intercon-
nected banking systems, has been investigated only more recently (Allen and Gale, 2001;
Eisenberg and Noe, 2001; Elsinger et al., 2006; Freixas et al., 2000; Rochet and Tirole,
1996), taking center stage mostly after the recent financial crisis (Acemoglu et al., 2015;
Battiston et al., 2016b; Elliott et al., 2014; Stiglitz, 2010). When the two features are
considered together, the valuation of interdependent claims at a given time with arbitrary
maturity is, in general, a non-trivial problem (Eisenberg and Noe, 2001) with crucial pol-
icy implications. The seminal work of Eisenberg and Noe (2001) (EN), which has been
very influential in the literature on interbank contagion and systemic risk, has developed
a framework to deal with the problem of interdependence in the absence of ex-ante uncer-
tainty and bankruptcy costs. Their main result is that, in the case in which contracts are
interbank debt securities, mild conditions on the network topology, and a simple maturity
structure, it is possible to uniquely determine the so-called clearing payment vector, i.e.
how much each bank is required to pay to the other banks in order to maximise the total
payments in the system. A more recent work (Rogers and Veraart, 2013) has extended
the EN model by showing that, despite the fact that bankruptcy costs may imply multiple
solutions, one can still uniquely determine the solution that is preferable for all banks.
An important limitation of the EN framework is that the valuation of claims is carried
out ex-post, i.e. at the maturity of the contracts, once the amount of external funds of
each bank is known. One only needs to compute how losses, if any, should be redistributed
among the surviving financial institutions. While EN emphasized the importance of mov-
ing towards an ex-ante valuation accounting for uncertainty (deriving, e.g., from possible
shocks or cashflows between the valuation date and the maturity date), and despite the
great interest in financial contagion spurred by the 2008 crisis, most works on systemic risk
and stress-testing of interbank networks have focused on the original ex-post framework
in which valuation and maturity times coincide (Acemoglu et al., 2015; Cifuentes et al.,
2005; Elsinger et al., 2006; Glasserman and Young, 2015; Rogers and Veraart, 2013).
Therefore, a gap has emerged between this growing body of works on interconnected-
ness with ex-post valuation and the vast literature on the ex-ante valuation of corporate
obligations. The latter, building on the classic Merton approach (Merton, 1974), deals
with the problem of ex-ante valuation in the presence of uncertainty but does not encom-
pass interdependence between claims, with a few exceptions (Cossin and Schellhorn, 2007;
Fischer, 2014; Hain and Fischer, 2015; Suzuki, 2002).
The framework introduced in Suzuki (2002) applies also to the case in which cross-
ownerships exist and Fischer (2014) further generalizes it to the case of obligations with
different seniorities and derivatives. However, such results rely on two crucial assumptions.
First, the payments made by each firm are a continuous function of the payments made
by all firms. The assumption of continuity rules out the presence of mechanisms such as
costs of default and abrupt loss of values in assets due to fire sales. Second, for any given
level of seniority of the cross-holdings of debt each firm must also hold external liabilities
with the same seniority.
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Moreover, in the approach of Suzuki (2002) and Fischer (2014), in order to carry out an
ex-ante valuation of the claims on a given institution (under the assumption of no arbitrage
opportunities and market completeness), one needs to compute all possible trajectories
of the stochastic processes followed by the assets of all institutions involved. In other
words, this approach can be thought of as global valuation mechanism, since it implicitly
assumes that the computation can be carried out by an entity with full knowledge of all
the parameters of the financial system including all interbank exposures.
In contrast, as we show, the computation of the EN solution requires banks to know
only local information about their counterparties at each step, although this holds at the
expenses of not accounting for uncertainty. While such a global valuation approach is of
great theoretical interest, it remains unclear whether the computation could be decentral-
ized and therefore how feasible it would be its application as a valuation mechanism.
Another gap in the literature has also emerged between the theoretical insights from the
stress-testing exercises based on the EN approach and the experience of practitioners and
policy makers. Indeed, according to the BIS, the largest part of losses suffered by financial
institutions during the financial crisis was not due to actual counterparties’ defaults, but to
the mark-to-market revaluation of obligations following the deterioration of counterparties’
creditworthiness. This approach is called Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA)1. This
means that, while in the EN framework the default of a bank is the only event that matters
for triggering losses down the chain of lending contracts, in practice also the deterioration
of a bank’s book matters for triggering those losses. Currently, this mechanism is not
taken into account by most models of systemic risk (Furfine, 2003; Gai and Kapadia,
2010; Upper, 2011), and in particular by all those based on the EN model, although its
importance has been increasingly acknowledged (Glasserman and Young, 2015). While
the framework of DebtRank (Batiz-Zuk et al., 2015; Battiston et al., 2012) is one of the
few models building on the idea of distress propagating even in the absence of defaults, its
current formulation does not provide a consistent endogenous treatment of the recovery
rate.
In light of the above considerations, in this paper we develop a novel general framework,
which we refer to as Network Valuation Model (NEVA), for the valuation of claims among
institutions interconnected within a network of liabilities, with the following characteris-
tics. Similarly to EN, it is possible to endogenously determine a set of consistent values for
the claims, following the default of some institutions. Differently from EN, we account for
ex-ante uncertainty on the values of external assets, arising when the valuation is carried
out at some time before the maturity of the claims, as commonly done in practice. From
this point of view, while our approach is perfectly compatible with a global valuation
mechanism (as in Fischer (2014); Suzuki (2002)), it also provides a decentralized valuation
mechanism in which banks perform an ex-ante valuation of their claims in a decentralized
1The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision states that “roughly two-thirds of losses attributed to
counterparty credit risk were due to CVA losses and only about one-third were due to actual defaults.”
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011).
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fashion. In other words, the financial system as a whole performs the valuation recursively
via a distributed mechanism through which each bank only needs information about the
valuation of the claims of its own counterparties at each step of the calculation. Finally,
in contrast with Suzuki (2002) and Fischer (2014) we avoid specific assumptions about
the continuity of the valuation performed by banks, therefore allowing for the possibility
to account for costs of default and fire sales, e.g. as in Rogers and Veraart (2013).
More in detail, the timing of the framework can be best conceived of in four steps.
At time zero all contracts are set, resulting from various possible investment allocation
strategies, which are not explicitly modelled here and are not relevant to our results. At
time one there is a shock on one or more of the external assets of the banks. At time t ≥ 1
the valuation is carried out, while contracts mature at time T ≥ t. The framework also
allows for contracts with multiple maturities. Between t and T possible changes in the
value of external assets are accounted for. Remarkably, on the one hand, we obtain the
ex-post approach of Eisenberg and Noe, as well as the Rogers and Veraart extension as
limit cases of the NEVA model when the time of the valuation is assumed to be the same
as the time of the maturity and there is no uncertainty on the value of the external assets
held by banks. On the other hand, the classic ex-ante valuation Merton approach can
also be obtained as a limit case in which there are no interbank claims and external assets
follow a geometric Brownian motion up to maturity. More interestingly, it is possible to
extend the EN decentralized computation of consistent valuations to the case in which
valuations are consistent expected values of the claims under local knowledge of the shock
distribution. In particular, we show that the DebtRank model (Bardoscia et al., 2015a;
Battiston et al., 2016a, 2012) is obtained as a limit case in which shocks on external
assets before the maturity follow a uniform distribution. We characterize the existence
and uniqueness of the solutions of the valuation problem under general conditions on the
functional form of the valuation function, i.e. on how the value of each claim depends on
the equity of the counterparty. Further, we define an algorithm to carry out the network
valuation and provide sufficient conditions for convergence in finite time to the greatest
solution (in the sense that the equity of each banks is greater or equal than in the other
solutions) with a given precision. Finally, under additional assumptions, we show that
the solutions of parametric families of ex-ante NEVAs models (i.e. before the maturity)
smoothly converge to the solutions of the corresponding ex-post NEVA models (i.e. at the
maturity).
2 Framework and Definitions
We consider a financial system consisting of n institutions (for brevity “banks” in the
following) engaging in credit contracts with some others. Our goal is to set out a general
framework (NEVA) in which banks can evaluate their own interbank claims on other
banks (and thus their own equity) in a network of liabilities, by taking into account
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simultaneously the claims of all the banks in the network. Credit contracts are established
at time 0 and are taken as given, with Lij denoting the book value of the debt of bank
i towards bank j, and Aji denoting the book value of the corresponding asset of bank j,
with Aji = Lij . Banks also have assets and liabilities external to the interbank system,
which we denote respectively with Aei and L
e
i . The external assets of banks are subject to
stochastic shocks, and this is the only source of stochasticity in the model.
We denote by Tij the maturity of the contract between i and j (with respect to a
reference time zero) and by t the time at which the evaluation of the financial claims is
carried out. In the special case in which t = Tij , for all i, j, the evaluation takes place at
maturity. This is precisely the case considered in the ex-post clearing procedure in most
works based on Eisenberg and Noe (2001). However, more in general, it is of practical
interest the case in which the evaluation takes place before the maturity, hereafter referred
to as ex-ante evaluation. In this case, we want to determine at t < T the value of banks’
liabilities knowing the underlying distribution of shocks that could affect banks external
assets between t and T .
We denote the book value of the equity of bank i, i.e. the difference between its total
assets and liabilities taken at their book (face) value as Mi:
Mi = A
e
i − Lei +
n∑
j=1
Aij −
n∑
j=1
Lij . (1)
However, a proper valuation of equity of bank i, denoted here with Ei, will depend on how
much bank i values its own assets. Such valuation can markedly differ from the face value,
and will certainly depend on several parameters associated with specific contracts. Most
importantly, it will depend on other banks’ equities, or more precisely on their valuation
of their equities. For instance, one can expect the value of an asset corresponding to a
loan extended from bank i to bank j to depend on both Ei and Ej and, reasonably, larger
values of equities will imply larger valuations of the assets. Such intuition is formalised in
the following definition:
Definition 1. Given an integer q ≤ n, a function V : Rq → [0, 1] is called feasible
valuation function if and only if:
1. it is nondecreasing: E ≤ E′ ⇒ V(E) ≤ V(E′),∀E,E′ ∈ Rq
2. it is continuous from above.
The general idea behind the definition of feasible valuation function is that one can write
the value of any asset as the product of its face value times a valuation function, such
that it ranges from the face value of the asset to zero. In general, the valuation performed
by bank i of its claim against bank j, under the assumption that such valuation depends
only on banks’ equities and other parameters associated with their specific contract, is:
AijVij(E|α) , (2)
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where Vij : Rn → [0, 1] is a valuation function and α is a set of parameters. Analogously,
we can write the value of external assets of bank i assuming that it is function of equities
(and additional parameters):
AeiVei (Ei|α) , (3)
where Vei : R → [0, 1] is a valuation function. In the remainder of this paper we mostly
focus on examples in which the valuation function of external assets has the form (3) and
in which the valuation function of interbank assets depends on the equity of the borrower,
i.e. Vij(E| . . .) = Vij(Ej | . . .). However, we point out that all the results that we derive still
hold in the more general case in which the valuation functions depend on all the equities.
Each bank will assess the value of its equity at time t as the difference between the
valuation of its assets minus the value of its liabilities:
Ei(t) = A
e
iVei (E(t)| . . .)− Lei +
n∑
j=1
AijVij(E(t)| . . .)−
n∑
j=1
Lij ∀i , (4)
where, as customary, we consider all liabilities to be fixed at their book value. Since all
valuation functions take values in the interval [0, 1], equities Ei(t) are bounded both from
below and from above:
mi ≡ −Lei −
n∑
j=1
Lij ≤ Ei(t) ≤Mi ∀i . (5)
By introducing the following map:
Φ :
n
i=1
[mi,Mi]→
n
i=1
[mi,Mi] (6a)
Φi(E(t)) = A
e
iVei (E(t)| . . .)− Lei +
n∑
j=1
AijVij(E(t)| . . .)−
n∑
j=1
Lij ∀i , (6b)
the set of equations (4) can be rewritten in compact form:
E(t) = Φ(E(t)) . (7)
The map Φ allows each bank to compute its own equity given the equities of all the
banks in the network. Such valuations are self-consistent only for the equity vectors E(t)
that satisfy relation (7). In order to implement a consistent network-based valuation of
interbank claims it is essential to prove the existence of solutions of (7). For the sake of
readability in the following we will drop the explicit dependence of equities on the time t
at which the valuation is performed.
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3 Main results
We now outline the most general results, which apply to generic feasible valuation func-
tions.
Theorem 1 (Existence). The set of solutions of (7) is a complete lattice.
This implies in particular that the set of solutions is non-empty and that there exist a
least E− and greatest solution E+ such that for any solution E∗, E−i ≤ E∗i ≤ E+i , for
all i. Within the set of solutions, the greatest solution is the most desirable outcome for
all banks, as it simultaneously minimizes losses for all of them. Understanding how to
compute such solution is therefore of paramount importance. Let us explicitly note that
every solution E∗ of (7) corresponds to a fixed point of the iterative map
E(k+1) = Φ(E(k)) , (8)
and viceversa. Eq. (8) defines the usual Picard iteration algorithm (called “fictitious
sequential default algorithm” in Eisenberg and Noe (2001)) and in principle provides a
method to compute the solutions with arbitrary precision, as we will show in the following.
Iterating the map starting from an arbitrary E(0) does not guarantee that the solutions E+
and E− can be attained. In fact different solutions of (7) can be found depending on the
chosen starting point. Moreover, some solutions might be unstable, in the sense that, while
still satisfying (7), choosing a starting point for Picard iteration algorithm arbitrary close
to (but not equal to) such solutions, will result in the iterative map converging to another
solution of (7). The problem of finding the least and greatest solution this problem is
solved by the following theorems:
Theorem 2 (Convergence to the greatest solution). If E(0) = M:
1. the sequence {E(k)} is monotonic non-increasing: ∀k ≥ 0, E(k+1) ≤ E(k),
2. the sequence {E(k)} is convergent: limk→∞E(k) = E∞,
3. E∞ is a solution of (7) and furthermore E∞ = E+.
Theorem 2 shows that, if the starting point of the iteration is E(0) = M, which corresponds
to taking all assets at their face value, the iterative map (8) converges to the greatest
solution E+. Theorem 2 guarantees that for all  > 0, there exists K() such that for all
k > K() we have that ||E(k) − E+|| < . In other words, once a precision  has been
chosen, starting from the face values of equities M, and after a finite number of iterations,
the Picard algorithm provides equities (8) that are undistinguishable from the greatest
solution, within precision .
Mutatis mutandis, it is possible to prove that:
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Theorem 3 (Convergence to the least solution). If E(0) = m and the valuation functions
in Φ are continuous from below, then:
1. the sequence {E(k)} is monotonic non-decreasing: ∀k ≥ 0, E(k+1) ≥ E(k),
2. the sequence {E(k)} is convergent: limk→∞E(k) = E∞,
3. E∞ is a solution of (7) and furthermore E∞ = E−.
Analogous results to the ones proved after Theorem 2 also hold in this case.
Therefore, Theorems 2 and 3, provide a simple algorithmic way to check whether the
solution of (7) is unique within numerical precision:
Corollary 1 (Uniqueness). If E+ = E−, the solution of (7) is unique.
Let us now put these results in the context of the existing literature. In order to prove
the existence of a solution, Suzuki (2002) and Fischer (2014) exploit the Brouwer-Schauder
fixed point theorem, which requires payments made by each firm to be a continuous
function of the payments made by all firms. The assumption of continuity does not
allow to account for default costs. However, in Suzuki (2002) and Fischer (2014) the
iterative map is not required to be monotonic, allowing to model some derivatives having
a specific functional form. Since the Brouwer-Schauder fixed point theorem does not give
any information about the structure of the solution space (e.g. the existence of a greatest
and a least solution) it is important to have a unique solution. In order to prove uniqueness
Suzuki (2002) and Fischer (2014) resort to the additional hypothesis that the ownership
matrix (the analogous of our matrix Aij) is strictly left substochastic, meaning that for
any given level of seniority of the cross-holdings of debt each firm must also hold external
liabilities with the same seniority. Here we use instead the Knaster-Tarski fixed point
theorem, which requires valuation function to be monotonic – preventing a straightforward
modeling of derivatives – and not necessarily continuous. As a consequence, default costs
and analogous mechanisms can be easily accommodated in our framework (see Sec. 4).
Through the Knaster-Tarski fixed point theorem we prove, not only the existence of a
solution, but also the existence of a greatest and a least solution. Remarkably, Theorem
2 shows that the greatest solution is attained if the starting point of the valuation is the
face value of claims, providing a clear prescription to perform the valuation even when
multiple solutions exist.
3.1 Results on Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs)
Proof of the existence of an algorithm that ensures the convergence to a solution in a finite
time are usually based on assumptions on the form of the valuation function (Hain and
Fischer, 2015). In contrast, here we show that such result holds for a specific topology of
the network of interbank liabilities, namely a DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph), regardless
of the functional form of the interbank valuation functions.
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Proposition 1 (DAG). If the matrix defined by interbank assets Aij is the adjacency
matrix of a DAG and Vei (E) = 1, ∀i:
1. the map (8) converges in a finite number of iterations,
2. the solution of (7) is unique.
Proof. We define source banks as those banks that do not hold interbank assets, i.e.
S0 = {i : Aij = 0,∀j}, which is a non-empty set if the matrix of interbank exposures
is a DAG. We then partition banks based on the maximum graph distance from the set
of source banks S0, the partition being {Sd}dmaxd=0 . Starting from the initial condition M,
banks in S0 converge in zero iterations to their face value as their equity does not depend
on the equity of any other bank (neither their own). Banks in S1 converge in one iteration
as their equity only depends on the equities of banks in S0. By induction, banks in Sdmax
converge in dmax iterations. Starting from the initial condition m banks in S0 converge
in one iteration to their face value as the Picard iteration algorithm corrects the value
of their equities exactly in one iteration. Consequently, Φ(dmax)(M) = Φ(dmax+1)(m), and
therefore all banks converge to E− = E+ in (at most) dmax + 1 iterations.
4 Examples
We now highlight the generality of the NEVA outlined in Section 2 by presenting a few
relevant examples. More specifically, we show that four different models well known in the
literature about systemic risk can be recovered as limit cases.
Proposition 2 (Eisenberg and Noe). If:
1. Vei (Ei) = 1, ∀i,
2. Vij(Ej) = 1Ej≥0 +
(
Ej+p¯j
p¯j
)+
1Ej<0, ∀i, j,
there is a one-to-one correspondance between the solutions of (7) and the solutions of the
map Φ introduced in Eisenberg and Noe (2001).
Proof. As already noted, since in EN the evaluation happens at maturity, t = Tij for
all i, j. Under the assumptions of (i) limited liabilities, (ii) priority of debt over equity,
(iii) proportional repayments, EN aims at computing a clearing payment vector p∗ whose
component p∗i is the total payment made by bank i to its counterparties. To conform to
their notation, we also introduce the obligation vector p¯, defined as p¯i =
∑
j Lij , which is
the total interbank liability that bank i needs to settle. Eisenberg and Noe (2001) show
that:
p∗i = min
ei +∑
j
Lji
p∗j
p¯j
, p¯i
 , (9)
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where ei = A
e
i −Lei , and external liabilities are also due at the same maturity of interbank
liabilities. Eq. (9) can be equivalently rewritten as:
p∗i = p¯i1Ei≥0 + (Ei(p
∗) + p¯i)+ 1Ei<0 , (10a)
with
Ei(p) = A
e
i − Lei +
∑
j
Aij
pj
p¯j
−
∑
j
Lij , (10b)
where 1x>0 is the indicator function relative to the set defined by the condition x > 0 and
(x)+ = (x + |x|)/2. The above equations are equivalent to (4) by choosing the valuation
functions as in the hypotheses of the Proposition 2. In fact, when Ej > 0, the cash inflow
of bank j is enough to cover its due payments, and therefore p¯ = p∗. In contrast, when
Ej < 0, bank j employs its residual assets (Ej + p¯j)
+ to repay its creditors proportionally
as much as it can.
Proposition 3 (Rogers and Veraart). If:
1. Vei (Ei) = 1Ei≥0 + α1Ei<0, ∀i,
2. Vij(Ei, Ej) = [1Ei≥0 + β1Ei<0]
[
1Ej≥0 +
(
Ej+p¯j
p¯j
)+
1Ej<0
]
, ∀i, j,
there is a one-to-one correspondance between the solutions of (7) and the solutions of the
map Φ introduced in Rogers and Veraart (2013).
Proof. The proof is entirely analogous to the proof of Proposition 2.
Let us note that, if α < 1 (β < 1), then Vei (Vij) is not a continuous function. In
particular, a value of α (β) strictly smaller than one means that when a bank defaults its
external (interbank) assets will suddenly experience a relative loss of α − 1 (β − 1), due
e.g. to the necessity to liquidate them in a fire sale.
Proposition 4 (Furfine). If:
1. Vei (Ei) = 1, ∀i,
2. Vij(Ej) = 1Ej≥0 +R1Ej<0, ∀i, j,
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the solutions of (7) and the solutions of the
map Φ introduced in Furfine (2003).
Proof. According to the Furfine algorithm a counterparty with non-negative equity is
always able to fully repay its liabilities, while, if its equity is negative, it will only repay a
fraction R of them. This is exactly what the valuation function in Proposition 4 accounts
for.
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Figure 1: Interbank valuation functions as a function of the equity of the borrower. Pa-
rameters as follows. EN: p¯ = 2, Furfine: R = 1, Linear DebtRank: M = 2.5, Ex-ante EN:
Ae = 1, p¯ = 2, β = 1, σ = 1.
Proposition 5 (Linear DebtRank). If:
1. Vei (Ei) = 1, ∀i,
2. Vij(Ej) =
E+j
Mj
, ∀i, j,
there is a one-to-one correspondance between the solutions of (7) and the solution of
recursive map (linear DebtRank) introduced in Bardoscia et al. (2015a).
Proof. The easiest way to prove the correspondence is to compute the incremental variation
of the iterative map (8), which in this case reads: E
(k+1)
i −E(k)i =
∑
j Aij
(
E
(k)
j
)+−(E(k−1)j )+
Mj
,
for all i. Starting the Picard iteration algorithm from M we recover (7) in Bardoscia et al.
(2015a), in which M has been denoted with E(0). As soon as the equity of bank j becomes
equal to zero in the iterative map in Bardoscia et al. (2015a), it will not change anymore,
which is consistent with the incremental variation derived above.
DebtRank has been introduced in Battiston et al. (2012) as an effective model to
propagate shocks in the interbank network. Subsequently, a generalization of the model
(which we call linear DebtRank here) has been derived from the balance sheet identity and
from simplified assumptions about the propoagation of distress in the interbank market in
Bardoscia et al. (2015a). The model has been further extended in Bardoscia et al. (2016,
2015b).
In Fig. 1 we plot several interbank valuation functions: EN (see Proposition 2), Furfine
(see Proposition 4), Linear DebtRank (see Proposition 5), and ex-ante EN, which will be
introduced in Sec. 5.
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5 An application: Eisenberg-Noe with ex-ante valuation
On one hand, as already remarked, EN allows to compute the payments banks have to
make to their counterparties. From Proposition 2 it is clear that to compute such payments
one needs to know the values of all equities, thus implying that such computation should
happen at the maturity. On the other hand, the evaluation of corporate debt before
the maturity done by means of the Merton model (Merton, 1974) does not account for
the recursive evaluations that are needed when creditors and debtors form a complex
interconnected network. The aim of this section is to bridge this gap by introducing a set
of valuation functions that allows to perform the ex-ante valuation of interbank claims,
therefore accounting for the additional source of uncertainty deriving by the impossibility
to have an unerring estimate of the assets values and equities before the maturity.
In the context of Asset Pricing Theory (APT), Fischer (2014) and Suzuki (2002) show
that, assuming no arbitrage and market completeness, the ex-ante valuation at time t < T
of the random variable Ei(T ) at maturity can be performed by computing its condi-
tional expectation with respect to the (unique) Equivalent Martingale Measure (EMM)
Q: Ei(t) = EQ[Ei(T )|F(t)], where F(t) is the filtration at time t associated with Ei and,
for simplicity, the returns of the riskless bond have been set to zero. In order to compute
such conditional expectation, one needs to find the fixed point of (7), for any realization of
the underlying stochastic processes. Such computation can be only performed by a central
authority with full knowledge of all the parameters of the system.
Although the global ex-ante valuation can be also performed within our framework,
here we focus instead on local ex-ante valuation, in the sense that, while the valuation
is performed collectively by all banks, each bank only has information about its own
counterparties. This happens precisely because, (i) the aforementioned uncertainty is
entirely incorporated into the valuation functions and (ii), as it can be seen from (4), in
order to compute an iteration of the Picard iteration algorithm (8), each bank only needs
information about its own counterparties. Moreover, such set of valuation functions will
naturally extend EN.
As regards the valuation functions of external assets, we simply take them as in Propo-
sition 2. For what concerns interbank assets, we note that if the valuation occurred at
maturity banks could use the interbank valuation functions in Proposition 2, in which the
equity would be the equity at the maturity T . This information, however, is not available
to banks before T . We now assume that, from the time t at which the valuation happens
until maturity T , (i) the only uncertainty that banks must consider during the evaluation
process is due to external assets, and (ii) external assets follow a stochastic process Ae(t).
Hence, the variation of equity between t and T is equal to the variation of the external
assets, i.e. E(T ) = E+∆Ae. From a technical point of view, the difference between global
and local ex-ante valuations is that in the first case one computes the expectation of the
fixed point of (7), while in the second case one computes the fixed point of (7) in which
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the expectations of the valuation functions appear:
Ei(t) = EQ[Ei(T )|F(t)] = EQ[Aei (T )|F(t)]− Lei +
n∑
j=1
AijEQ[V
(EN)
ij (Ej(T ))|F(t)]−
n∑
j=1
Lij
= Aei (t)− Lei +
n∑
j=1
AijEQ[V
(EN)
ij (Ej(T ))|F(t)]−
n∑
j=1
Lij ,
(11)
where V(EN)ij are the valuation functions in Proposition 2. Once the stochastic process
followed by external assets is known, we can identify the valuation functions for interbank
assets with their expectation conditioned on the observation at time t:
Vij(Ej) ≡ EQ[V(EN)ij (Ej)|F(t)] = E
[
1Ej(T )≥0 + β
(
Ej(T ) + p¯j
p¯j
)+
1Ej(T )<0
∣∣∣Aej(t)
]
= E
[
1Ej(T )≥0|Aej(t)
]
+ βE
[(
Ej(T ) + p¯j
p¯j
)+
1Ej(T )<0
∣∣∣Aej(t)
]
= 1− pDj (Ej) + βρj(Ej) ,
(12)
where we have defined the probability of default:
pDj (Ej) = E
[
1Ej(T )<0|Aej(t)
]
= E
[
1∆Aej<−Ej
] (13a)
and the endogenous recovery:
ρj(Ej) = E
[(
Ej(T ) + p¯j
p¯j
)+
1Ej(T )<0
∣∣∣Aej(t)
]
= E
[(
Ej(T ) + p¯j
p¯j
)
1−p¯j−Ej≤∆Aej<−Ej
]
.
(13b)
Strictly speaking, β appearing in (12) would be equal to one in EN. Here, we include it to
account for additional default costs. Moreover, its presence will be relevant in the context
of Proposition 7. From (12) we can see that the valuation function can be thought of
as the expectation over a two-valued probability distribution: If the borrower j does not
default at maturity, bank i will recover the full amount Aij , while if bank j defaults, bank
i will in general recover a smaller amount. From this point of view, β can be thought of as
an additional exogenous recovery rate on top of the endogenous recovery rate ρj . Finally,
we note that (12) defines feasible valuation functions.
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Proposition 6. In the limit in which the maturity is approached, i.e. t→ T , the interbank
valuation function (12) converges to the interbank valuation function of EN (Proposition
2).
Proof. First we notice that, as t → T the variation in external assets goes to zero with
probability approaching one, and therefore from (13) we have that pDj (E) → 1Ej<0 and
that ρj(E)→
(
Ej+p¯j
p¯j
)+
1Ej<0, from which the proposition easily follows.
5.1 Ex-ante valuation with geometric Brownian motion
In the spirit of the Merton model we will compute the expected value of assets at maturity
(here, for the sake of convenience, maturity T is common to all interbank claims) given
our observation of the value of external assets before the maturity (at time t), assuming
that external assets follow independent geometric brownian motions:
dAei (s) = σA
e
i (s)dWi(s) ∀i s , (14)
where, for simplicity, we consider the drift to be equal to zero. The PDF of ∆Aei is:
p(∆Aei ) =
1√
2pi(T − t)σ(∆Aei +Aei )
e
−
[
log
(
1+
∆Aei
Ae
i
)
+ 12σ
2(T−t)
]2
2σ2(T−t) . (15)
From (13) we then have:
pDj (E) =
1
2
[
1 + erf
[
log(1− E/Aej) + σ2(T − t)/2√
2(T − t)σ
]]
1E<Aej
(16a)
ρj(E) =
(
1 +
E
p¯
)(
pDj (E)− pDj (E + p¯)
)
+
1
2p¯
cj(E) (16b)
with
cj(E) =− erf
σ2(T − t)/2− log
(
1− E/Aej
)
√
2(T − t)σ
1E<Aej
− erf
σ2(T − t)/2 + log
(
1− E/Aej
)
√
2(T − t)σ
1E<Aej
+ erf
σ2(T − t)/2 + log
(
1− (E + p¯)/Aej
)
√
2(T − t)σ
1E<Aej−p¯
+ erf
σ2(T − t)/2− log
(
1− (E + p¯)/Aej
)
√
2(T − t)σ
1E<Aej−p¯ .
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Theorems 1 and 2 ensure that there exists a greatest solution (therefore optimal for all
banks) and that such solution can be computed with arbitrary precision using the Picard
iteration algorithm (8).
5.2 Comparison between valuation functions
For illustrative purposes here we perform a stress test on a small financial system composed
by three banks, A, B, C. We choose a simple ring topology, A → B → C → A with the
following parameters:
Ae =
105
3
 Le =
94
3
 A =
 0 0.5 00 0 0.5
0.5 0 0
 , (17)
so that all three banks have a book value of their equity equal to one. Total leverages,
defined as the ratio between total assets and book values of equity, range from 10.5 to
3.5. Our stress test consists in applying an exogenous shock to the external assets of all
banks, resulting in a relative devaluation α, i.e. Aei → (1−α)Aei . The variation in external
assets of bank i, measured as the difference between its external assets before the shock
and its external assets after the shock is ∆Aei = αA
e
i . Using (4) we can readily compute
the corresponding variation in equity, again measured as the difference between the equity
before the shock (i.e. its book value) and the equity after the shock: ∆Ei = αA
e
i +∑
j Aij(1 − Vij(E∗j )). Network effects can be quantified as the total losses in the system
minus the losses directly caused by the exogenous shock:
∑
i ∆Ei −∆Aei =
∑
ij Aij(1 −
Vij(E∗j )), which can be conveniently normalised by its maximum,
∑
ij Aij :∑
i ∆Ei −∆Aei∑
ij Aij
=
∑
ij Aij
[
1− Vij(E∗j )
]
∑
ij Aij
. (18)
In the left panel of Fig. 2 we show the behaviour of the quantity (18) as a function of the
exogenous shock on external assets, for several valuation functions. For Furfine we use
R = 0, while for ex-ante EN (NEVA in the legend) we use β = 1 and (14) with σ = 0.1,
for all banks. Interestingly, we can see that for smaller values of the exogenous shock
network effects are larger for the ex-ante EN than for EN at maturity, while the situation
is reversed for larger values of the exogenous shock. This is consistent with the fact that
uncertainty deriving from being before the maturity can both lead to lower and higher
valuations of interbank claims. Lower valuations correspond to potential sizeable losses
that can happen even in the presence of smaller shocks, while higher valuations correspond
to positive fluctuations in the value of external assets that can lead to a recovery in the
presence of larger shocks.
Another way to assess the extent of network effects is the following. Let us imagine
that each bank wants to valuate the interbank assets of its counterparty using the standard
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Figure 2: Stress test consisting in applying an exogenous shock to external assets of all
banks and by re-evaluating interbank claims. Left panel: network contribution (normalised
to its maximum value) as a function of the exogenous shock, for several valuation functions.
Right panel: difference between the discount factor of the valuation of an interbank claim
performed with the standard Merton approach and discount factor of the valuation of an
interbank claim performed with ex-ante EN (NEVA).
Merton approach. This amounts to using the valuation function (12) and evaluating it
in the book value of the equity of the counterparty. Hence, the lender i discounts its
interbank assets Aij towards the borrower j by a factor Vij(Mj). If the same valuation is
performed using NEVA, more specifically using ex-ante EN, the discount factor equals to
Vij(E∗j ). In the right panel of Fig. 2 we show the difference between such discount factors,
i.e. between the discount factor of the valuation of an interbank claim performed with
the standard Merton approach and the valuation of an interbank claim performed with
ex-ante EN (NEVA in the legend) valuation functions with β = 1 and (14) σ = 0.1, for all
banks. The difference is maximal for intermediate values of the exogenous shock. In fact,
for small values of the shock network effects are small, while for large values of the shock
the valuation of interbank claims becomes less and less important, as most losses will be
direct losses due to the exogenous shock.
6 Limit behavior of solutions
We now introduce a sequence {Vlij} of valuation functions. For example, different values
of l could correspond to different values of a parameter in the NEVA. For each value of l
we have a different equation (7) of the form E = Φl(E). We will denote the k-th iteration
of the corresponding map in (8) with Φ
(k)
l . In order to clarify the rationale behind the
introduction of sequences of valuation functions, we will consider the following example.
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Let l be an index associated with the distance to maturity, so that maturity is approached
as l increases. For a given l we can compute the solution El corresponding to the given
maturity. The question now arises: in the limit l → ∞ (that is, as maturity approaches)
will the solutions of the ex-ante valuations corresponding to the equations E = Φl(E)
approach the solution of the ex-post valuation (that is, at maturity) corresponding to
the equation E = Φ∞(E)? Solving this problem essentially boils down to identifying
sufficient conditions under which an interchange of the two limits (one on the model
parameters and the other on the iterations of the Picard algorithm) is legit. A positive
answer to this question will allow us to relate ex-ante and ex-post valuation models,
correctly identifying ex-ante models as genuine generalizations of ex-post ones to the case
of arbitrary maturity. The following theorem provides an affirmative answer for non-
decreasing valuation functions.
Theorem 4. If:
1. the sequences {Vlij} are monotonic non-decreasing: Vlij(E) ≤ Vl+1ij (E), ∀E, i, j, l,
2. the sequences {Vlij} are pointwise convergent: liml→∞Vlij(E) = V∞ij (E), ∀E, i, j,
3. there exists a unique solution for E∗ = Φ∞(E∗), where Φ∞ is the map corresponding
to the valuation functions V∞ij (E),
4. V∞ij (E) is a continuous function, ∀i, j.
then liml→∞El = E∗, where El = limk→∞Φ
(k)
l (M).
For non-increasing valuation functions the requirement that Φ∞ has a unique solution can
be relaxed.
Theorem 5. If:
1. the sequences {Vlij} are monotonic non-increasing: Vlij(E) ≥ Vl+1ij (E), ∀E, i, j, l,
2. the sequences {Vlij} are pointwise convergent: liml→∞Vlij(E) = V∞ij (E), ∀E, i, j,
then liml→∞El = E∗, where El = limk→∞Φ
(k)
l (M).
6.1 Limit to linear DebtRank
As a first application of the limit theorems we now consider the following sequence of
valuation functions:
Vlij(Ej) = 1− pDj (Ej) + βlρj(Ej) l = 1, 2, . . . , (19)
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where {βl} is a monotone non-increasing sequence of real parameters such that liml→∞ βl =
0 and ∆Aej has the uniform distribution in the interval [−Mj , 0], ∀j. Then:
pDj (E) = 1−
(E)+
Mj
(20a)
ρj(Ej) =
[
Ej + p¯j
p¯jMj
(b− a) + b
2 − a2
2p¯jMj
]
1b>a , (20b)
where b(E) = −(E)+ and a(E) = max(−p¯j − E,−Mj). The valuation functions Vlij
are monotonic non-increasing in l and converge to the valuation functions, V∞ij (Ej) =
(Ej)
+/Mj .
Proposition 7. If:
1. the sequence {βl} is such that liml→∞ βl = 0,
2. the sequences {Vlij} are chosen as in (19), ∀i, j,
3. the probability of default and the endogenous recovery (13) are computed with ∆Aej
having a uniform distribution in the interval [−Mj , 0], ∀j,
then the solution of the corresponding equation (7) converges to the solution E∗ of the
linear DebtRank.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Theorem 5. By using the previous proposition
one can effectively re-interpret linear DebtRank as an ex-ante EN model in which shocks
are negative and the exogeneous recovery rate β is equal to zero.
6.2 The case of geometric Brownian motion
We have already discussed the case in which external assets follow a geometric brownian
motion in Section 5.1. Here we consider a sequence {Vlij} of valuation functions with
corresponding maturities {Tl}, with liml→∞ Tl = t, i.e. the limit l → ∞ corresponds
to the limit in which the distance to maturity goes to zero. In this limit the valuation
functions Vlij converge pointwisely to the valuation functions of EN (see Proposition 6).
If we could apply either of Theorems 4 and 5, the solutions El of NEVA with interbank
valuation functions in (12) (the ex-ante EN) would converge to the solution E∗ of the
(ex-post) EN. Unfortunately, Vlij are neither non-increasing nor non-decreasing and the
theorems cannot be applied. To see why this is the case, let us note that the interbank
valuation functions of EN are equal to zero for E < −p¯ and equal to one for E > 0 (see
Proposition 2). From (15) we can see that there is always a non-zero probability that
the variation of external assets ∆Ae is either positive or negative. Hence, the interbank
valuation functions obtained by plugging (16) into (12) take values in the open interval
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(0, 1). Therefore, for E < −p¯ (E > 0) they are larger (smaller) than interbank valuation
functions of EN.
Nevertheless, in the Appendix we present three numerical examples in which the con-
vergence of the solutions of the NEVA with interbank valuation functions in (12) (the
ex-ante EN) with external assets following a geometric Brownian motion to the solutions
of EN holds. This provides a sound background to conjecture that the convergence might
be proven to hold under more general hypotheses.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduce a general framework that allows financial institutions to per-
form an ex-ante network-adjusted valuation of interbank claims in a decentralized fashion.
On the one hand, our framework encompasses some of the most widely used models of fi-
nancial contagion (Bardoscia et al., 2015a; Eisenberg and Noe, 2001; Furfine, 2003; Rogers
and Veraart, 2013), in the precise sense that the model is equivalent to those models for
specific choices of the valuation functions and the parameters. On the other hand, our
framework relates also to the stream of literature (Fischer, 2014; Suzuki, 2002) carrying
out the valuation of claims a` la Merton when cross-holdings of debt exist between different
firms. An important contribution of our approach is that the valuation is decentralized,
meaning that it does not assume the existence of an entity with perfect information on
the parameters of the financial system.
Our main result is that, under mild assumptions about valuation functions, the valu-
ation problem admits a greatest solution, i.e. a solution in which the losses of all banks
are minimal. Moreover, we provide a simple iterative algorithm to compute such solu-
tion. Furthermore, we derive a set of conditions under which the solution of the valuation
problem at the maturity time T is equal to the limit of the sequence of solutions obtained
for the valuation problems at t < T as the maturity is approached (i.e. t → T ). In
other words, the solution of the problem at the maturity coincides with the limit for the
valuation time approaching the maturity of the solutions of problems at a given valuation
time.
A natural application of our framework is in devising stress-tests to assess losses on
banks’ portfolios in a network of liabilities, conditional to shocks on their external assets
in order to determine capital requirements and value at risk. Indeed, to any given shock
on the external assets of the banks it corresponds a different valuation of banks’ equities.
Therefore, by assuming a known distribution of shocks, one can derive a corresponding
distribution of equity losses. Finally, such distribution can be taken as the input of any
axiomatic risk measure (Biagini et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2013).
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Appendix: Proofs of Theorems
Theorem 1: Existence of a greatest solution
To prove it we just need to show that: (a) the function Φ maps a complete lattice into
itself, Φ : T → T , (b) the function Φ is an order-preserving function. To prove (a) we
notice that if valuation functions are feasible then:
∀E ∈ Rn mi = −Lei −
∑
j
Lij ≤ Φi(E) ≤ Aei − Lei +
∑
j
Aij −
∑
j
Lij = Mi
and consequently T =
n
i=1[mi,Mi] is a complete lattice such that Φ : T → T , that
proves (a). Since Φ is a linear combination of monotonic non-decreasing functions in E,
then ∀E,E′ if E < E′, follows Φ(E) ≤ Φ(E′), where the partial ordering relation in T is
component-wise, i.e. x ≤ y iff ∀i xi ≤ yi. So both conditions (a) and (b) hold and the
Knaster-Tarski theorem applies. The set of solutions S of (7) is then a complete lattice,
therefore it is non-empty (the empty set cannot contain its own supremum) and, more
importantly, it admits a supremum solution, E+, and an infimum solution, E−, such that
∀E∗ ∈ S, E− ≤ E∗ ≤ E+.
Theorem 2: Convergence to the greatest solution
Convergence will be proved by induction. For n = 0 we have
E(1) = Φ(E(0)) ≤M = E(0)
Assume now that the claim is true for all 0 ≤ m ≤ n, then
E(n+1) = Φ(E(n)) ≤ Φ(E(n−1)) = E(n)
where we have used the fact that Φ is monotonic non-decreasing and E(n) ≤ E(n−1) by
hypothesis, We know that {E(n)} is bounded below and monotonic non-increasing, by the
Monotone Convergence Theorem we have that E∗ = limn→∞E(n) = infn{E(n)} exists
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and is finite. By hypothesis Φ is continuous from above (because under assumptions of
Theorem (1) we know that the valuation functions are feasible), hence
Φ(E∗) = Φ(lim
n
E(n)) = lim
n
Φ(E(n)) = lim
n
E(n+1) = E∗
So that E∗ ∈ S. We will now prove it must be that E∗ = E+. First we need to establish
a preliminary result, namely that E(n) ≥ E+,∀n. Reasoning by induction, it is trivially
true for the initial point that E(0) ≥ E+. Suppose now that it is true up to a given n¯,
E(n¯) ≥ E+ then, since Φ is order-preserving,
E(n¯+1) = Φ(E(n¯)) ≥ Φ(E+) = E+
Now, knowing that E(n) ≥ E+,∀n we have that E∗ = infn{E(n)} ≥ E+. But E∗ ∈ S,
hence E∗ = E+.
Theorem 3: Convergence to the least solution
Convergence will be proved by induction. For n = 0 we have
E(1) = Φ(E(0)) ≥m = E(0)
Assume now that the claim is true for all 0 ≤ m ≤ n, then
E(n+1) = Φ(E(n)) ≥ Φ(E(n−1)) = E(n)
where we have used the fact that Φ is monotonic non-decreasing and E(n) ≥ E(n−1) by
hypothesis. We know that {E(n)} is bounded above and monotonic non-decreasing, by the
Monotone Convergence Theorem we have that E∗ = limn E(n) = supn{E(n)} exists and is
finite. By hypothesis Φ is continuous from below, hence
Φ(E∗) = Φ(lim
n
E(n)) = lim
n→∞Φ(E
(n)) = lim
n→∞E
(n+1) = E∗
So that E∗ ∈ S. We will now prove it must be that E∗ = E−. First we need to establish
a preliminary result, namely that E(n) ≤ E−,∀n. Reasoning by induction, it is trivially
true for the initial point that E(0) ≤ E−. Suppose now that it is true up to a given n¯,
E(n¯) ≤ E− then, since Φ is order-preserving,
E(n¯+1) = Φ(E(n¯)) ≤ Φ(E−) = E−
Now, knowing that E(n) ≤ E−,∀n we have that E∗ = supn{E(n)} ≤ E−. But E∗ ∈ S,
hence E∗ = E−.
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Theorem 4: Limit behavior from non-decreasing valuation functions
Let us consider the sequences Φnl ≡ Φ(n)l (M), where the index n denotes composition of
Φ with itself n times. Since the valuation functions are monotonically non-decreasing in l
then ∀E Φl(E) ≤ Φl+1(E) that implies Φnl ≤ Φnl+1. Since Vlij(E) are all feasible valuation
functions we also have that Φnl ≥ Φn+1l . From this follows, and boundedness of the
sequences in both indices, it follows that liml limn Φ
n
l = E˜ exists. Monotonicity, punctual
convergence and continuity of the limit valuation function imply, by Dini’s Theorem,
uniform convergence of Φl(E) to Φ∞(E). Uniform convergence and continuity of Φ∞
imply that E∗ = Φ∞(E∗). Since, by assumption, the solution is unique then we must have
that E˜ = E∗. Thus liml limn Φnl = liml limn Φ
n
l that is equivalent to the thesis.
Theorem 5: Limit behavior from non-increasing valuation functions
Let us consider the sequences Φnl ≡ Φ(n)l (M). Since the valuation function is monotonic
non-increasing in l then ∀E Φl(E) ≥ Φl+1(E) that implies Φnl ≥ Φnl+1. Since Vlij(E) are
all feasible valuation functions we also have that Φnl ≥ Φn+1l . Hence, the sequences Φnl
are all non-increasing in both indices and bounded from below, from this follows that
liml limn Φ
n
l = liml limn Φ
n
l that is equivalent to the thesis.
Appendix: Numerical examples
In our examples, the financial system is composed of three banks that use the interbank
valuation functions (12) and in which external assets follow the geometric brownian motion
(14). For each network topology we vary the time to maturity Tl and we compute equities
via (7). We also compute equities for the (ex-post) EN, also via (7). We set β = 1.0, i.e.
we do not include an additional exogeneous recovery. External liabilities are equal to zero
for all banks in all cases.
Open chain
A→ B → C
Ae =
11
1
 A =
0 1.2 00 0 1.2
0 0 0

Tree
B ← A→ C
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Figure 3: Open chain. Solid blue: equities E∗j,l as a function of the distance to maturity
Tl for the NEVA with interbank valuation functions in (12) (ex-ante Eisenberg and Noe
model). Dashed red: equities E∗j for the (ex-post) Eisenberg and Noe model. Panels from
the top to the bottom refer to banks A, B, and C.
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Figure 4: Analogous of Fig. 3 for a tree.
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Closed chain
A→ B → C → A
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Figure 5: Analogous of Fig. 3 for a closed chain.
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